Abstract
"ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE" AND THE CONCEPT OF "I": A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
This article examines the philosophical gap between artificial intelligence and the human mind. It first clarifies core notions—intelligence, consciousness, reason, will, pleasure, and pain—and explains their roles in mental functioning. The discussion then assesses how far AI can emulate these capacities. John Searle’s Chinese Room suggests that symbol manipulation can yield correct outputs without understanding. Hubert Dreyfus argues that genuine expertise relies on intuition, embodiment, and context sensitivity, which exceed formal rules. David Chalmers’s “hard problem” highlights why subjective experience (qualia) resists purely computational accounts. Thomas Metzinger’s self‑model theory claims that consciousness presupposes an internal model of the subject. Daniel Dennett interprets complex behavior via the intentional stance yet warns about “counterfeit people” eroding social trust. The text also contrasts animals and humans and, drawing on Kant’s causality of freedom, anchors will in moral responsibility. Language and symbolic thought, together with the childhood emergence of theory of mind, mark a qualitative difference; although AI displays speed and pattern recognition, it lacks lived perspective, selfhood, and meaning. Consequently, the gap between computational prowess and understanding remains. The distinctiveness of the human mind is therefore not merely cognitive but existential. Future research and governance should address consciousness, agency, and ethics when evaluating advanced AI systems.
Keywords
Artificial intelligence, philosophy, self, consciousness, will
